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IN DECEMBER 2004, the new Barroso Commission brought
the saga of the French and German infringements of the
Stability and Growth Pact to a close by lifting the “excessive
deficit” procedure launched in 2003. That same month, the
Commission launched infringement proceedings against
Greece that has been providing inaccurate public deficit
statistics since the creation of the Pact in 1997. The new
head of the Commission also declared that there would be
no major overhaul of the Pact. In the November 2003 crisis,
when the Council suspended the implementation of the Pact
at a time France and Germany overshot its deficit ceiling,
most observers called the Pact dead and many rejoiced
since the Stability and Growth Pact had come under heavy
criticism for some time.
A year after, we asked four leading scholars that have
studied monetary integration: have news of the death of the
Stability and Growth pact been grossly exaggerated? Should
it be resuscitated? Why or why not? Amy Verdun and
Nicolas Jabko argue that the Pact will survive for lack of an
alternative able to gather the support of a large bipartisan
cross-national coalition. Henrik Enderlein then argues that
the pact should not be fixed but broken. Finally, Andrew
Martin explains why the real problem does not so much lie
with the Pact per se, but instead with the philosophy behind
the EMU policy mix (restrictive fiscal and monetary policies).
It creates vicious circles: By keeping economic growth too
low the European central bank retarded the expansion of
public revenue, making it more difficult to meet the Pact
requirements.
-Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor
The Rise and Rise of the Stability and Growth Pact
Amy Verdun
DURING THE CREATION OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
(EMU) in the European Union (EU) it was prophesized
many times that the single currency would never happen,
and if it did, that it was doomed to fail (the “rise and fall” of
EMU). It has often been argued that the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) will likely lead a similar life. However, it is my
view that the SGP might lead the same life as the euro:
strengthening when many believe it will not be a success.
Hence: the rise and rise of the SGP.
First conceived in 1995 by Theo Waigel, the SGP was
eventually agreed to at the June 1997 Amsterdam Summit
by all fifteen Member States (in the form of two Council
regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97 and a European Council
resolution 97/C 236/01). The main idea was to make sure
that Member States would continue keeping their budgetary
deficits under control after having entered EMU. The Treaty
on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty (1992)
stipulates that Member States should avoid excessive
deficits which are defined in a protocol to the Treaty as
budgetary deficits not exceeding three per cent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Yet, the Treaty does not spell
out in detail how this aim is to be achieved or what to do if
these excessive deficits exist. In fact, it speaks about possible
sanctions, but contains only a very rudimentary version of
the excessive deficit procedure.
The SGP was created in the wake of the Maastricht
Treaty. It should come as no surprise that the Germans were
the most concerned about possible fiscal profligacy once
the euro would have been introduced. It was the Germans
who were leading the pack in the two decades prior to the
signing of the Maastricht Treaty that spelled out the road to
EMU. They were also the ones who would lose the most if
EMU turned out to be less successful than they hoped for.
The Germans saw their stable and strong deutschmark as a
point of national pride, indeed national culture (referred to
as ‘stability culture’) which secured low inflation following
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century and indeed in the rest of Europe throughout the
1980s and 1990s. They were the trendsetters in monetary
policy – a policy that was followed unquestioned by the
national central banks of the other countries that
participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of
the European Monetary System (EMS). The Germans
were most concerned about possible increases in inflation
once the euro was introduced and the risk of ‘free riding’
when some Member States would run high budgetary
deficits.
The governments these Member States would be
borrowing funds in a market that was now open to all and
not paying the same price for these funds as they would
have had they stayed outside EMU. The excessive
borrowing could bring about inflation and interest rates
which would be covered by all Member States, but could
be benefiting only the countries that were borrowing
excessively (or running an excessive deficit). Without the
corrective mechanisms of devaluations or significantly
higher interest rates for national governments with higher
debt or deficit ratios, the cost would be carried by all. It
was clear that if the Germans were dissatisfied with the
EMU regime, the move to stage three of EMU, and thereby
the eventual introduction of the euro, might be at risk.
The Germans did, however, voice a concern that others
shared, although no one was clear from the outset how to
go about arranging a good system to avoid excessive
deficits. The German government was keen to have strict
rules and, for the sake of credibility, have sanctions be
applied automatically. They did not trust politicians to be
able to take this decision as they would succumb to time
inconsistency. The French by contrast were not keen on
automatic rules but rather wanted Member State
governments to retain political control over the process.
The other Member States acquiesced to having the
Germans and the French sort out their differences
between themselves as they represented the two dominant
views among the Member States. The end-result was a
compromise package that had some degree of
automaticity but still left a few moments of decision-making
to the Member States (Ecofin).
When the SGP was first created the general feeling
was that it was a rather strange policy. It was the first that
would penalize Member States that badly if they indeed
went overboard (as stated in the Council regulation No
1467/97, the sanction would be equal to 0.2 % of GDP,
and a variable component equal to one tenth of the
difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in
the preceding year and the reference value of 3 % of
GDP). Though it had preventive measures as well
(surveillance, economic coordination of policies, and an early
warning mechanism) the SGP was generally seen as a stick
(as opposed to a ‘carrot’) or as some daringly said ‘an atomic
bomb’. It was to scare governments away from certain deviant
behavior (fiscal profligacy), but it did not offer many real carrots
(incentives/rewards/encouragement) for ‘good behavior’. The
stick-no-carrot problem is at the heart of the problems
surrounding the SGP. Another problem was that it assumed
the longevity of government. In fact, many of the national
governments in office in the late 1990s should have made some
cut-backs when the times were good, in order to be in a good
position to spend more (or collect fewer taxes) when the times
were bad. This behavior did not occur, notably in France and
Germany during the upturn of 1999/2000. Furthermore, the
SGP was aimed at simple rules that could be understood by
all. So rather than complicated calculations about how to
calculate an excessive deficit based on what the government
might be spending the money on (e.g. investment versus
consumptive expenditures) was not taken into account. The
aim, again, was clarity, not necessarily any other indicator.1
The SGP came under attack when it became clear that if
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) were to be applied it
would require that governments, of France and Germany for
example,  pursue ‘counter-cyclical’ policies; they would have
to tax more and spend less in an economic downturn. An
economic adviser would recommend that governments do
exactly the opposite. This phenomenon then drew criticism to
the SGP. The clashing point came when France and Germany
managed to hold the Pact in abeyance when the Ecofin Council
of 25 November 2003 decided not to move to the next stage
of the excessive deficit procedure (there was no ‘qualified
majority’ to carry through that decision). At this point most
newspapers declared the SGP dead.
Today, a year later, we find that the SGP is still on the
agenda. Noises are being made about making the SGP more
intelligent, trying to increase the number of carrots, possibly
examining the golden rule of finance or the question of whether
deficits are being used to pay for investment rather than
consumptive expenditures. All these suggestions of reform have
not been settled, but various options are being considered.
What will happen? The official parlance is that the
implementation of the Pact should be improved while keeping
legal changes to a necessary minimum. In my view, EU leaders
will find a compromise that keeps the spirit of the SGP intact,
but that gives the Member States more incentives to perform
well in the run up to creating a possible deficit (hence avoiding
their creation). Why would they do that? First, no one is against
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25 November 2003 was not a pretty day for EU integration.
It seemed a clear case of larger Member States getting their
way whereas smaller Member States could never have pulled
the same stunt. The question of equality and respect for the
rules (the same for all) was at stake. If at all possible, the
Member States will try to get rid of the impression that larger
Member States are able to ‘bully’ the smaller ones. Third,
not having any rules at all might undermine EMU – which is
an important economic and politically crucial symbol of
successful European integration. No one wants to risk the
collapse of EMU. Fourth, avoiding excessive deficits also
implicitly means creating a buffer that can be used to deal
with the issue of shortages in some Member States’
government savings that need to be filled to pay out an
annually larger amount of pensions as a result of demographic
changes. Fifth, every Finance Minister has an interest in a
constraint that can be instrumental in her interaction with the
spending ministries at the national and subnational levels.
Thus for all these reasons it seems to me that the SGP is
here to stay – regardless of what the critics say. We will not
see the rise and fall of the SGP, but rather the rise and rise
of the Pact.
Amy Verdun is Jean Monnet Chair and Associate
Professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Victoria, Canada.
No Immediate Death, but More Headaches to
Come
Nicolas Jabko
AS  THE  NEW  EUROPEAN  COMMISSION and the recently
appointed chair of the group of euro area finance ministers
get down to work, the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact is once again the talk of the town in Brussels. This a
sensitive political issue because of the bruising memories of
the November 2003 crisis, when Germany and France
overshot the budget deficit ceiling of the Pact and the Council
agreed to suspend its implementation against the opinion of
the Commission. EU officials are now scrambling to come
up with a way to mend the Pact, so as to avoid a repetition
of this kind of crisis in the near future. Contrary to what
many observers said a year ago, nobody in official EU circles
seems ready to pronounce the Pact dead. Yet nobody has a
miracle reform solution either.
At first glance, it is not easy to grasp why the task of
reforming the Pact should be so difficult. The Pact was
established in 1997 in order to ensure a certain level of
fiscal discipline in the European Union and thus buttress the
credibility of Europe’s new currency. It was supposed to
prevent member states from free riding on their neighbors
by running high budget deficits. In a monetary union, fiscal
profligacy entails a collective risk of inflationary pressures,
higher interest rates, or even the demise of the new currency.
Everybody in the EU agrees that this kind of behavior should
not be allowed. Everybody also agrees that a reasonable
balance must be found between the need for commonly
agreed rules and member states’ understandable reluctance
to run economic policies on automatic pilot. What is the big
fuss about reforming the Pact, then?
The fact is that a reform of the Pact raises much bigger
issues than the technical problem of improving the current
set of rules. At stake in this reform is a fundamental tension
between two opposite sets of motivations upon which the
euro was built.2 For a first group of actors, the euro meant
carried the promise of more orthodoxy in economic policy-
making. This neo-liberal dimension of EMU has been
described as a delayed European reaction to the inflationary
economic recession of the 1970s.3 From this perspective,
it is important to see that the Pact was more than just a way
of dealing with the free rider problem. It was also the last
piece in a framework of Economic and Monetary Union
that essentially enshrined Germany’s stability-oriented model
in EU law. Before the Pact was adopted in 1997, the 1992
Maastricht Treaty already provided for an independent
European Central Bank focused on the fight against inflation
and for an elaborate mechanism of multilateral surveillance
designed to check governments’ tendencies to overspend.
This orthodox vision of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) had a strong political support. A Europe-wide elite
coalition fought for an EMU that would prioritize the fight
against inflation and rein in government spending. In
particular, German central bankers and government officials
accepted to sacrifice the deutsche mark on the altar of
European unity only on condition that the ECB look as much
as possible like the German Bundesbank. The Germans
were not alone, since many politicians and officials outside
Germany were also in favor of more discipline in public
spending. On the whole, the partisan preferences of fiscal
conservatives in Germany and in other European
governments converged with the bureaucratic preferences
of central bankers and financial officials all across the EU.
Today, this coalition is still very much alive and has even
become stronger, in a sense, with the institutionalization of
the orthodox vision behind the euro. The flag-bearers of
economic orthodoxy are not always the same as in the mid-
1990s – they are less likely these days to hold a German
than a Dutch or even a Spanish passport. But orthodoxy
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is a vocal opponent of any weakening of the Pact. All other
things being equal, this is also often the case for conservative
politicians as well as finance ministry officials. For ideological
or bureaucratic reasons, both groups would generally like to
see more discipline in government spending and consider
the Pact as a last line of defense against government profligacy.
On the other side of the fence, a second group of actors
ascribes a completely different meaning to the euro. Even
though this is sometimes forgotten today, the appeal of
sovereignty played an important role in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and, in a sense, it remains powerful today. Even
at the time when EMU and the Stability Pact were introduced,
not everyone in Europe had fallen in love with fiscal
conservatism and low inflation. Many actors simply agreed
to at least pay lip service to these policies. They accepted
the stick of orthodox policies only because it came alongside
the carrot of the euro. With the growing international mobility
of capital, the European Monetary System of quasi-fixed
exchange rates had become politically very problematic for
countries like France and Italy. In effect, the Bundesbank
was making monetary policy for the entire European
continent, and government policies were subject to the
enormous pressure of currency speculators.
Just like there was a coalition in favor of orthodoxy be-
hind the drive for the euro, then, there was also a coalition in
favor of EMU as a way to reassert sovereignty. For this
second coalition, the euro opened the way for governments
to regain some degree of freedom in an increasingly global
economy. The actors who pushed for monetary union, es-
pecially in France and Italy, saw it as a way to challenge the
hegemony of the German central bank and of the markets.
Many politicians – and their voters – saw the status quo as
politically unacceptable because it involved an obvious sub-
ordination to Germany and to the markets. Unless we take
into account this category of motivations, it is impossible to
understand why EMU became such a high political priority
for these countries in the late 1980s.
This sovereignty-oriented vision of EMU still has some
currency today. Of course, sovereignty in a strict sense is
now somewhat beside the point with the advent of the euro.
The management of the new currency has been delegated to
the European Central Bank at the EU level. But this has not
meant the disappearance of the old sovereignty-seeking po-
litical coalition altogether. The euro now serves as a shield
for member government policies against currency crises.
While governments are constrained by the rules of the Pact,
they are in a much better position to assert their prerogatives
over fiscal policy today than when they faced the threat of
market speculation within the European Monetary System.
Now that the euro exists and that it can no longer be seen as
a carrot, governments are understandably reluctant to ac-
cept the rigid stick of the Growth and Stability Pact.
In sum, the contradictory political aspirations that moti-
vated the creation of the euro are resurfacing today in the
context of the debate on the Stability and Growth Pact. The
political vision that fuelled the euro in the 1980s-90s was
successful because it offered something to everybody – to
the Germans and to the French, to the Right and to the Left,
to the bankers and to the politicians. Today, the successors
of these two coalitions support the two opposite political
agendas of budget consolidation and national fiscal au-
tonomy. In reforming the Pact, therefore, the difficulty to-
day is not merely to strike a “reasonable” balance between
two legitimate concerns. Perhaps more importantly, any re-
form of the Pact has to strike a political balance between
two coalitions and their agendas. Yet the problem is that the
EU is not an electoral arena where two coalitions could
clearly articulate their preferred reforms and let the people
have the last word. So for the time being, the most likely
outcome is a dilatory reform that will keep the lid over the
dispute without really addressing it. EU officials may find a
way to patch up the Stability and Growth Pact, but the un-
derlying contest between political visions will undoubtedly
resurface in the future.
Nicolas Jabko is National Foundation for Political Sci-
ence Research Fellow at the CERI in Paris, France.
The Stability and Growth Pact is Broken?
Don’t Fix it!
Henrik Enderlein
The discussion on the SGP raises two types of problems:
one of economic effectiveness and one of democratic legiti-
macy. As I will argue, both aspects are closely linked and
their combination implies that the EU might be best advised
to completely abolish the SGP.4From the perspective of
economic effectiveness, the conduct of domestic fiscal poli-
cies in a monetary union is subject to two largely opposite
requirements.
First, there are good reasons to limit member states’
freedom of action. Since monetary policy in a currency union
cannot react to inappropriate fiscal policies in single mem-
ber states by ‘punishing’ individual governments through an
increase of interest rates, some countries might try to free-
ride on the stability-oriented policy of their peers. Such free-
riding is generally looked at from the perspective of deficits:
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that they will still benefit from relatively low interests. There
is however a second perspective, which is often overlooked:
countries with high inflation rates and high growth rates may
be tempted to free-ride on low inflation rates in low growth
countries by limiting their efforts to cool down the domestic
economy. The discussion on Ireland’s unwillingness to run a
sufficiently large surplus in 1999/2000 nicely illustrates that
point. In sum: there is an important rationale in a monetary
union to constrain domestic fiscal choices in order to pre-
vent collective action problems.
Second, there are good arguments to grant member
states full discretion over their domestic fiscal choices. The
main reason is that in a monetary union the importance of
the use of fiscal policies as stabilizing instruments increases.
The ECB has decided to derive its interest rates from aver-
age data of the euro area as a whole (‘one size fits all’). It
follows that the single interest rate does not necessarily cor-
respond to the needs of every domestic economy: real in-
terest rates may be too high for some countries (e.g. Ger-
many) but too low for others (e.g. Ireland, Spain, and the
Netherlands). Against this background, domestic fiscal poli-
cies can become key instruments in cyclical stabilization.
High real interest countries should run deficits to offset the
dampening effect of the ECB’s policy, whereas low interest
countries should run surpluses to prevent cyclical overheat-
ing.
When the SGP was initially discussed in 1996, the fo-
cus was almost exclusively on the deficit aspect of the col-
lective action problem. Neither inflationary free-riding by
high-growth countries nor domestic stabilization was given
much attention. At that time, most economists argued that
growth and inflation differentials across EMU would disap-
pear automatically as a consequence of increased trade:
low inflation countries facing relatively high real interest rates
would become more competitive and thus benefit from
growth through trade. Unfortunately, this mechanism (which
focuses on the so-called real exchange rate effect) has not
worked in practice. As recent studies indicate (see for ex-
ample Chapter 4 in this fall’s World Economic Outlook of
the IMF), the destabilizing real interest rate effect is domi-
nant in comparison to the stabilizing real exchange rate ef-
fect. The reason is that large parts of growth in European
economies are still generated by non-traded goods.
Today, an ideal framework for fiscal policy-making in
EMU should seek to incorporate all elements of economic
effectiveness: it should prevent collective action problems
while allowing for appropriate fiscal stabilization in the do-
mestic economies. While it might be technically possible to
devise such frameworks, they would however suffer from a
considerable lack of democratic legitimacy.
A first approach could be to fully transfer the decision-
making authority over domestic fiscal stances to the Euro-
pean level. This would amount to establishing prescriptive
and binding fiscal targets for each member state. It is straight-
forward to see why such an approach would face a prob-
lem of democratic legitimacy. Decisions on national fiscal
stances, their financing, and their inter-temporal implications
(e.g. inter-generational distribution) are at the very core of
government’s prerogatives and should only in very extreme
cases be separated from direct electoral choice. It is un-
likely that voters would accept binding fiscal prescriptions
from EU bodies – they might remember the aphorism ‘no
taxation without representation’. Moreover, the enforce-
ment of such rules would certainly prove difficult.
A second approach could be a shift to a full-fledged
system of fiscal federalism. The EU budget, which currently
amounts to roughly one percent of the EU Gross Domestic
Product, would have to grow dramatically and would have
to include some redistributive mechanism that would ensure
that surplus-money from the fastest growing Member States
be used to compensate low inflation and low growth coun-
tries. This solution, which to some extent exists in the US
and also in Germany, might have some appeal but looks
unrealistic at the present juncture (or could you imagine Ire-
land wiring money to Germany?). Fiscal federalism in Eu-
rope could be a long-term target but not a short-term solu-
tion.
Against this background a third approach might work
best. It would be based on the assumption that the euro
area would be better off in a framework without sanctions
and enforcement, i.e. without a rule-based approach to fis-
cal discipline. Authority over domestic fiscal choices would
be fully returned to the Member States.
What could such a solution look like? The present Ar-
ticle 104 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure would have to
be amended, as well as secondary legislation on the SGP.
In principle, both sets of instruments could be scrapped.
Article 99 on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines would
remain in place. Its soft provisions, based on the clause that
‘Member States shall treat their economic policies as a mat-
ter of common concern’, would continue to set out non-
binding requirements on the appropriate conduct of fiscal
policies. Yet Member States would ultimately retain their
full autonomy to go against such recommendations. The
framework would fully rely upon peer and public pressure.
The main benefit of abolishing the SGP would be to
return full political ownership of fiscal decisions to Member
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pluses are of a fundamentally political nature. EU institu-
tions should be allowed to issue recommendations and
should to defend these in public discourse. However, Mem-
ber States should be allowed to disagree, giving national
politics the last word in the procedure.
I would argue that such a framework could strengthen
the democratic legitimacy of fiscal policies in EMU. Should
single Member States feel the need to submit themselves to
some kind of technocratic guidance, they could still decide
to do so at the national level. Belgium, for example, has
delegated significant power over the fiscal stance to the in-
dependent national Conseil Supérieur des Finances.
Experiences in the US and Canada show that such an
approach might work. Neither of the two countries has es-
tablished a rule-based deficit control mechanism for states
and provinces, although some US states and Canadian prov-
inces have balanced budget rules. Both federal systems trust
market forces to adjust borrowing costs and there are no
recent examples of state or provincial government default in
either of the two countries. It is true that several states and
provinces are accumulating excessive debts, yet as the re-
cent example of California shows, voters might ultimately
favor fiscal restraint over the risk of debt default.
It is quite unlikely that any rule-based framework at the
European level would succeed in establishing the right in-
centive structure to cope simultaneously with domestic sta-
bilization and the avoidance of free-riding. Instead of trying
to square the circle, the responsible actors in EMU might
be better off by scrapping the SGP and putting more em-
phasis on peer-pressure. This approach might look radical
in its formal implications, in practice however it could func-
tion more effectively than a badly reformed SGP.
Henrik Enderlein is assistant professor of economics
at the Free University of Berlin, Germany.
Blame the ECB, Not the Stability and Growth Pact
Andrew Martin
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) isn’t the problem in
the EMU macroeconomic policy regime, or at least not the
main problem. The main problem, from which the SGP con-
troversy distracts attention, is the European Central Bank’s
(ECB) excessively restrictive policy orientation.5
There is plenty wrong with the SGP — the arbitrariness
of the 3 percent rule, the consequent pro-cyclical tenden-
cies, and the insufficient room for maneuver it allows to coun-
tries, such as Germany, where the one-size-fits all monetary
policy is particularly restrictive, etc. — which other Forum
contributors will undoubtedly discuss. But the objective of
fiscal discipline which the SGP so clumsily and rigidly pur-
sues is not wrong. A good case can be made for budget
balances over the cycle, implying surpluses during expan-
sions as well as deficits during recessions, providing that
there is ample scope for automatic (and even discretionary)
stabilizers and also for public investment (in human as well
as physical capital), and, in the EMU context, coordination
of national fiscal policies to achieve a eurozone fiscal stance
consistent with a growth-promoting eurozone monetary
policy.
The catch is that the ECB’s monetary policy is not
growth-promoting, despite its claim that single-mindedly pur-
suing price stability, as the ECB unilaterally defines it, is the
best, and only, thing the bank can do to promote growth.
Even as it stands, the SGP would pose less of a problem if
the ECB’s monetary policy were not so restrictive. By keep-
ing growth too low — aborting the late 1990s growth spurt
and subsequently easing policy too little and too late as world
growth slowed — the ECB retarded revenue growth while
social policy burdens rose, making it much more difficult to
meet the SGP’s requirements than it would otherwise be.
The SGP can thus be evaluated only as part of the overall
EMU policy mix that perversely combines restrictive fiscal
policy with restrictive monetary policy.
The proposition that the ECB is excessively restrictive
rests partly on the following argument (overlooked in
conventional wisdom on the ECB). After an extended period
of disinflation like Europe’s in which policy has kept growth
below its potential and unemployment high, an extended
period of economic growth above its long-run potential —
a sustained growth spurt — is necessary in order to bring
unemployment back down to pre-disinflation levels.
Comparison of policies that permitted and prevented such
growth spurts in the 1980s and 1990s shows that policies
that prevented growth spurts at the cost of continued high
unemployment did not achieve lower inflation over the long
run (8-10 years) than policies that allowed them and achieved
lower unemployment.  Although growth spurts were
accompanied by increased inflation, it proved temporary,
so that lower unemployment was not achieved at the cost
of higher inflation over the long run than where monetary
policy prevented growth spurts to avert even temporary
inflation increases. Thus, the price in unemployment that the
ECB exacts for price stability is an unnecessary one. The
comparison also shows that it is primarily these differences
in macroeconomic policy rather than labor market rigidities,
as claimed by the ECB, that explain inter-country variations
in unemployment.EUSA Review    Winter 2005    7
So the main thing wrong with the EMU policy regime is
the ECB’s failure to pursue growth-promoting monetary
policy. Fixing that would make it easier to fix what’s wrong
with the SGP. The single monetary policy is inevitably too
tight for some countries and too loose for others, which is
why they need fiscal policy flexibility to adjust the policy
mix to their diverse conditions. In countries for which the
single monetary policy is too tight, it is especially difficult
politically, possibly suicidal, to comply with fiscal discipline
rules. This could often be true even if the rules were made
more flexible, as would most SGP reform proposals, as
long as fiscal policy was left to accelerate growth while
monetary policy kept the brakes on. With the brakes off, or
pressed more lightly, fiscal discipline would be as or more
necessary but also more compatible with growth and thus
more politically sustainable.
This more rational policy mix requires that the ECB ac-
cept responsibility for growth and employment as well as
price stability, as in the American Federal Reserve Bank’s
dual mandate. It is difficult to give the ECB a similar man-
date by changing the Treaty because of the need for una-
nimity. But it seems legally unnecessary. Free to interpret its
mandate as it sees fit, the ECB could easily set a less re-
strictive inflation target and more genuinely “support” the
other Community economic goals including a “high level of
employment,” as Articles 2 and 105 prescribe.
Fiscal discipline would then have to be reconfigured.
While member states would get more scope for adjustment
to their diverse conditions, their fiscal policies would have
to be coordinated so that they add up to an overall euro
zone fiscal stance that, combined with a more expansionary
monetary stance, gives the euro zone a macroeconomic
policy mix aimed at growth as well as reasonably low infla-
tion. At a minimum, such coordination would require shift-
ing the focus of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines to
the euro zone policy mix, including monetary as well as fis-
cal policy. This would, in turn, require the ECB to negotiate
with the Commission and the Euro Group in Ecofin about
the respective policy stances to be implemented. In other
words, the ECB would have to abandon its insistence that
even discussion of monetary policy by such other bodies,
not to speak of “ex ante coordination of macroeconomic
policy between other bodies and the ECB,” is an unaccept-
able infringement on its independence.
This would be a step toward the gouvernment
économique the French have called for, although further
steps might well be necessary. All this is doable without
difficult Treaty revision. But changing the ECB’s policy ori-
entation and operating mode would probably be as diffi-
cult. It might not be possible to fix the SGP and the EMU
macroeconomic policy regime of which it is a part in the
absence of an economic crisis severe enough to make Treaty
revision politically possible. But then it might be too late.
Andrew Martin is Research Affiliate at the Center for
European Studies of Harvard University
Endnotes
1 Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun (2004) “The Dog that
Would Never Bite? On the Origins of the Stability and
Growth Pact” Journal of European Public Policy 11(5):
773-88.
2 For a detailed historical account of EMU, see Kenneth
Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For more details
on the two broad political coalitions that fuelled EMU, I
refer to my 1999 article “In the name of the market” Journal
of European Public Policy 6 (3): 475 – 495.
3 See especially Kathleen R. McNamara, The Currency
of Ideas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
4 This article is based on Henrik Enderlein (2004) “Break
It, Don’t Fix It!” Journal of Common Market Policy,
42(5): 1309-1046.
5 I spell out the argument in chapter 2 of Andrew Martin
and George Ross, eds., Euros and Europeans:
Monetary Integration and the European Model of
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).